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1Abstract
Previous researchers have modelled the decision to accept a donor organ
for transplantation as a Markov decision problem, the solution to which is
often a control-limit optimal policy: accept any organ whose match quality
exceeds some health-dependent threshold; otherwise, wait for another. When
competing transplant centers vie for the same organs, the decision rule changes
relative to no competition; the relative size of competing centers aﬀects the
decision rules as well. Using center-speciﬁc graft and patient survival-rate data
for cadaveric adult livers in the United States, we have found empirical evidence
supporting these predictions.
Keywords: liver transplantation; competition; optimal stopping
JEL Classiﬁcation: C14, I12, L1.
1 Motivation and Introduction
Among some policy analysts, it is almost an article of faith that increasing competi-
tion in a market will improve outcomes—eﬃciency. Of course, whether this will, in
fact, obtain depends largely on the characteristics of the particular market. Consider,
for example, healthcare. Because operating a major health center involves substan-
tial ﬁxed costs, the number of such institutions in a market is typically small, so
issues of eﬃciency often revolve around volume; see, for example, Luft et al. [1987];
Shahian and Normand [2001] as well as Gaynor et al. [2005]. With relatively small
numbers of participants, researchers are particularly concerned with market conduct
as well as the eﬀects of mergers; see, for example, Gaynor and Vogt [2003]. In situa-
tions with small numbers of decision-makers, particularly in the presence of private
information, strategic behaviour can be especially important. A corollary of second-
best economics is, then, that increases in competition need not necessarily improve
eﬃciency. Nowhere is this, perhaps, more apparent than in organ transplantation.
2In the United States, with the passing of the National Organ Transplant Act
in 1984, Congress established the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
(OPTN), a uniﬁed transplant network. Since 1986, OPTN has been been operated
under federal contract by a non-proﬁt organization—the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS).
While there are around 5,800 hospitals in the United States, the number of organ
transplantion centers is just in the hundreds. To be sure, depending on the type of
organ to be transplanted, some variation in the number of transplantation centers ex-
ists. But, in the data we use below, there are just 143 liver transplant centers licensed
by OPTN/UNOS, of which 121 are for adults and 22 are for children. OPTN/UNOS
coordinates how these centers and others that transplant other types obtain organs
suitable for transplantation.
Under the rules of the OPTN/UNOS, the United States is sub-divided into eleven
regions; see ﬁgure 1 for a map outlining which region contains which states as well as
the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Regions are further
subdivided into Donation Service Areas; a Donation Service Area is a geographical
service area designated by the federal government. Each Donation Service Area is as-
signed to an Organ Procurement Organization for purposes of recovering organs from
all hospitals in that area. Donation Service Area designation and Organ Procurement
Organization assignments are made every four years (since 2002) by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. In any particular Donation Service Area, some Or-
gan Procurement Organizations serve just one transplant center, while others serve
several transplant centers.
Within a Donation Service Area, the rules for allocating donor organs diﬀer across
the types of organs. The reasons for this surely reﬂect the beneﬁts and costs of
3Figure 1: UNOS Regions
transplanting an organ into the recipient who is next on the waiting list. Basically,
the decision of the patient/surgeon concerning whether to accept a donor organ for
transplantation is an optimal stopping problem.
On the beneﬁt side, from the perspective of a potential recipient, not all organs are
of equal utility: for a given potential recipient, some are better matches than others.
That the blood type of the donor is important is uncontroversial. In addition, how
long the donor organ has been preserved on ice is also important as cold ischemia time
aﬀects graft success. In the decision of whether to accept a donor organ today, the
match quality of another organ available in the future is unknown. Optimal stopping
problems involve a trade-oﬀ: in the vernacular of the late eighteenth century, does
one accept a bird in hand or wait for the chance of getting the two in the bush?
The primary determinant of the cost of waiting is whether the life of the potential
recipient is endangered without transplantation. For some organs, such as kidneys,
a potential recipient can be kept alive by artiﬁcial means—for example, dialysis. For
other organs, such as livers, this is impossible. Not surprisingly, the mechanisms for
4allocating donated organs vary by the type of organ.
In the case of kidneys, for example, as the cost of waiting is relatively low, the
primary determinant in getting a kidney is match quality. Because the demand for
donor kidneys of suitable quality for transplantation greatly exceeds a relatively ﬁxed
supply, waiting lists exist. In the case of ties concerning matches of similar quality,
time spent on the waiting list determines which potential recipient gets the next
available donated kidney. Because dialysis is both painful and inconvenient, many
potential recipients try to ﬁnd living donors, often among close relatives, so they
can eliminate the wait. However, even a close relative need not be a good match
for some patients. In an attempt to exploit gains from trade and, thus, to increase
the number of patients who can be freed from the chains of dialysis, Alvin E. Roth
and co-authors (see, for example, Roth et al. [2004]; Roth et al. [2005a]; Roth et al.
[2005b]; Roth et al. [2007] as well as Saidman et al. [2006]) have advocated pair-wise
and even three-way trades. Such trades are feasible in the market for kidneys because
living donors can live healthy and productive lives with just one kidney.
For hearts and lungs (and, for the most part, for livers as well), the supply of donor
organs is from the deceased—cadaveric organs. Diﬀerent allocation mechanisms exist
to allocate these scarce resources. In particular, the allocation mechanisms that
have been established for hearts, livers, and lungs use medical need as the primary
determinant of priority on the waiting list for transplantation.
In this paper, we investigate cadaveric liver transplantation in adults. Liver trans-
plantations in adults are suﬃciently diﬀerent from those in children that, in most
locales, separate paediatric tranplantation centers exist. Also, paediatric transplan-
tation centers are relatively rare—perhaps one to every six for adults. Liver trans-
plantations involving living donors are also rare—historically, less than ﬁve percent.
5Oguzhan Alagoz, Lisa M. Maillart, Andrew J. Schaefer, and Mark S. Roberts [Alagoz
et al., 2004, 2007b] have discussed the diﬀerences between these sorts of transplanta-
tions and cadaveric-liver transplantations.
Below, we argue that, under the current allocation mechanism (known as the
MELD scoring system), the presence of competing transplant centers in a Donation
Service Area aﬀects the patient/surgeon acceptance decision through a mechanism
we refer to as competitive impatience: competition makes patient/surgeon decision-
makers more likely to accept a donor organ than when no competition exists, which
means (all other things being equal) the matches made under competition are pre-
dicted to be of weakly lower quality. Assuming match quality aﬀects graft success in
a weakly-positive way and holding all other factors constant, the survival function of
the waiting time to graft failure after transplantation is then predicted to be weakly
greater when no competitors exist than that under competition. When the competing
transplant centers in a Donation Service Area perform diﬀerent numbers of transplan-
tations and have waiting lists of diﬀerent lengths, such asymmetries are predicted to
aﬀect post-transplantation outcomes as well. Using center-speciﬁc actual as well as
risk-adjusted average graft and patient survival-rate data concerning cadaveric-liver
transplantations in adults in the United States, we have found that the predictions of
the theory are borne out by the data. We have also found evidence that center-speciﬁc
heterogeneity is important in explaining post-transplantation outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is divided into ﬁve sections. In the next section, we
describe in some detail the institutional features of liver transplantation, while in sec-
tion 3, we present a theoretical framework and then derive some of that framework’s
empirical implications. In section 4, we describe the data used in the empirical analy-
sis of section 5, while in section 6, we summarize our research and present conclusions.
62 Institutional Details
In the United States, in the case of livers, medical need is the primary determinant
of priority on the waiting list for transplantation. Speciﬁcally, the Model for End
Stage Liver Disease (MELD) disease-severity score has been established as the sole
determinant of waiting-list priority.1 The MELD scoring system was adopted on
2 February 2002. A MELD score is calculated using easily-measurable laboratory
values; the MELD score predicts, with some accuracy, a particular potential liver
recipient’s risk of dying without transplantation. The scale ranges between 6 and
40: a low score (for example, less than 10) predicts minimal risk of death without
transplantation, while an high score (for example, above 30) predicts a life-expectancy
of only a few months, or less, without transplantation.
Under the MELD scoring system, potential recipients have their names placed on a
list at a transplant center. For example, on 31 October 2009, there were approximately
19,000 potential recipients listed at some transplant center in the United States.
Based on the severity of the end-stage liver disease, as measured by the MELD score,
potential recipients then wait to see if they are eligible for the next-available donor
liver in UNOS.
Competition varies considerably at the local level—the ﬁrst stage in the allocation
process. In Nebraska, for example, where only one Organ Procurement Organization
exists, the Nebraska Medical Center (NEUN-TX1) is the only hospital currently per-
forming liver transplantation in adults. NEUN-TX1 maintains a list of potential
recipients. These patients await livers from those who will, by accident or stroke
1The major exception is in the case of Status 1 patients, who are given ﬁrst priority. A Status 1A
candidate has fulminant liver failure (a rapid, life-threatening loss of liver function) or has recently
received a liver transplant that failed shortly afterward. Status 1B candidates are children who have
chronic liver disease with severe and life-threatening complications. At any point in time in the
United States, however, less than one percent of patients are classiﬁed as Status 1A or 1B.
7or some other misfortune, die. In Missouri, on the other hand, which also has just
one Organ Procurement Organization, two transplant centers exist for adults, both
located in the city of Saint Louis: Barnes-Jewish Hospital (MOBH-TX1) and Saint
Louis University Hospital (MOSL-TX1). Both MOBH-TX1 and MOSL-TX1 main-
tain separate lists of potential recipients awaiting liver transplantation.2 We argue
that the decision problem faced by a patient/surgeon in Saint Louis is quite diﬀerent
from the one in Omaha. Below, we explain why competition matters.
Populous states (like California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Texas) are sub-divided into smaller geographical areas, Donation Service Areas. For
example, in California, in 2008, four Donation Service Areas existed—two in the
northern part of the state and two in the southern part. The two northern California
Donation Service Areas, for example, are the California Donor Network (CADN-OP1)
and Golden State (CAGS-OP1). The University of California at Davis Medical Cen-
ter transplant center (CASM-TX1) is part of CAGS-OP1, while California Paciﬁc
Medical Center (CAPM-TX1), the University of California at San Francisco Medi-
cal Center (CASF-TX1), and Stanford University Medical Center (CASU-TX1) vie
(“compete”) for organs in CADN-OP1.
When a donor liver is harvested in a Donation Service Area, the rules for its
allocation under UNOS are clear and well-deﬁned. In ﬁgure 2, we present a decision
tree in which are depicted the potential paths. In that ﬁgure, we have inserted
2In fact, potential organ recipients are permitted to be on waiting lists at more than one transplant
center, without penalty—a practice referred to as multi-listing. Multi-listing is believed by some to
give wealthy patients an advantage in getting to the head of the queue, so to speak. The geographical
distribution of donor organs is not coincident with the demand for organs. For example, because
livers have limited viability after harvest (about twelve hours), the tyranny of distance rears its ugly
head: a liver harvested in Honolulu may not be a viable option for a potential recipient in New York.
For this reason, and others, some fraction of harvested livers (David H. Howard [Howard, 2002] has
reported over ten percent, while Oguzhan Alagoz, Lisa M. Maillart, Andrew J. Schaefer, and Mark
S. Roberts [Alagoz et al., 2007a] have reported six percent) is never used, by anyone.
8numbers beneath each node:
1) the liver is oﬀered to Status 1A candidates, either locally (within the Donation
Service Area) or in the Region;
2) the liver is oﬀered to Status 1B candidates locally, within the Donation Service
Area;
3) the liver is oﬀered locally, within the Donation Service Area, to non-Status 1
candidates having MELD scores greater than or equal to 15, in descending order
of MELD score;
4) the liver is oﬀered in the Region to non-Status 1 candidates having MELD scores
greater than or equal to 15, in descending order of MELD score;
5) the liver is oﬀered locally, within the Donation Service Area, to non-Status 1
candidates having MELD scores less than 15, in descending order of MELD
score;
6) the liver is oﬀered in the Region to non-Status 1 candidates having MELD scores
less than 15, in descending order of MELD score;
7) the liver is oﬀered nationally to Status 1A candidates;
8) the liver is oﬀered nationally to Status 1B candidates;
9) the liver is oﬀered nationally to all other candidates, in descending order of
MELD score.
In general, the numbers of patients aﬀected by decisions at nodes 1 and 2 are
quite small; Alagoz et al. [2007a] have reported under twenty Status 1A candidates
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Figure 2: UNOS Rules for Allocating a Donor Liver by Status and Location
10in the entire nation at a particular point in time. Moreover, unlike non-Status 1
patients, few Status 1A patients sojourn on the UNOS list very long: Status 1A
patients have a life expectancy of fewer than seven days. On the other hand, in any
given Region, the numbers of patients aﬀected by decisions at nodes 3, 4, 5, and 6 can
be relatively large, perhaps a thousand at any given point in time. But the number of
transplant centers served in a Donation Service Area is often very small, sometimes
just one or two. In addition, under the MELD scoring system, only patients with
the highest scores are relevant to decisions being made. For example, in Region 6
(which contains Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington), there are
three Donation Service Areas and four transplant centers: HISF-TX1 (Hawaii Medical
Center–East), ORUO-TX1 (Oregon Health and Science University) and ORUO-VA1
(Portland Veterans Administration Medical Center, and WAUW-TX1 (University of
Washington Medical Center). In short, the number of relevant decision-makers is
small.
In situations with small numbers of decision-makers, strategic behaviour can arise.
Elsewhere, Dennis P. Scanlon, Christopher S. Hollenbeak, Woolton Lee, Evan Loh,
and Peter A. Uber [Scanlon et al., 2004] (who investigated heart transplantations) as
well as Jason Snyder [Snyder, in press] (who investigated liver transplantations before
the MELD scoring system was implemented) have reported evidence of this. While
we do not solve for the equilibrium of a (potentially asymmetric) game of incomplete
information, we appeal to game-theoretic notions when interpreting empirically the
eﬀects of competition on the post-transplantation outcomes for cadaveric livers in
adults in the United States.
Speciﬁcally, we argue below that competitive impatience aﬀects the patient/surgeon
acceptance decision: competition makes patient/surgeon decision-makers more likely
11to accept a donor organ than when no competition exists, which means (all other
things being equal) the matches made under competition are predicted to be of weakly
lower quality. Assuming match quality aﬀects graft success in a weakly-positive way
and holding all other factors constant, the survival function of the waiting time to
graft failure after transplantation is then predicted to be weakly greater when no
competitors exist than that under competition. When the competing transplant cen-
ters in a Donation Service Area perform diﬀerent numbers of transplantations and
have waiting lists of diﬀerent lengths, such asymmetries are also predicted to aﬀect
post-transplantation outcomes as well.
In the next section, we present a theoretical framework and then derive some of
that framework’s empirical implications.
3 Theoretical Framework
Basically, the decision of whether to accept a donor organ for transplantation is an
optimal stopping problem. From the perspective of a potential recipient, not all livers
are of equal utility: for a given potential recipient, some livers are better matches than
others. That the blood type as well as the age and sex of the donor are important
is uncontroversial. In addition, how long the donor liver has been preserved on ice
is also important as cold ischemia time aﬀects graft success. Whether the donor or
the recipient are obese, have diabetes, or have hepatitis C can aﬀect graft success,
too. In the decision of whether to accept a donor liver today, the match quality of
another liver available in the future is unknown. Optimal stopping problems involve
a trade-oﬀ: does one accept a bird in hand or wait for the chance of getting the two
in the bush? Intuitively, when the chance of getting the two birds in the bush goes
12down relative to before, then one is more likely to accept the bird in hand. We should
like to make formal this intuition and then to investigate the empirical importance
for post-transplant outcomes of competition in the allocation of cadaveric livers for
transplantation.
Of course, without transplantation, a potential recipient’s health deteriorates over
time. In the early stages of end-stage liver disease, the disease typically does not
progress as quickly as it does towards the end. Nevertheless, end-stage liver disease
is a progressive one which has, in the absence of successful transplantation, a known
endpoint—death. Thus, the relative value of transplantation increases as the disease
progresses.
In order to put structure on this problem, we initially make the following two
assumptions:
Assumption 1. The match quality of a donor organ can be summarized by a scalar
random variable Q having probability density and cumulative distribution functions
fQ(q) and FQ(q), respectively. Without loss of generality, let Q ∈ [0,1] where low
values of Q are ‘bad’ matches (ones having low chances of success) and high values
are ‘good’ matches (ones having high chances of success).
Assumption 2. The health of a potential recipient can be summarized by a scalar
random variable H. Without loss of generality, let H ∈ [0,1] where a value of zero
for H is death, while a value of one is complete health. Given an health state h today,
the distribution of tomorrow’s health state is weakly worse than today’s.
Given these assumptions, intuition suggests that some strategy involving a reser-
vation quality will be optimal: that is, accept any organ above some threshold quality.
It would indeed, however, be surprising if that threshold quality were independent
13of health status. In fact, researchers have demonstrated that, under plausible as-
sumptions, a control-limit optimal policy involves thresholds that vary with health
status.
The ﬁrst theoretical model of the patient/surgeon decision of whether to accept
an organ for transplantation was developed by Howard [2002], who investigated liv-
ers. In the spirit of research pioneered in economics by John Rust [Rust, 1987],
Howard constructed a stochastic dynamic-programming model of the decision faced
by a patient/surgeon, without considering the eﬀects of competition. Howard put the
following structure on the problem: ﬁrst, he assumed that per-period utility after a
successful transplantation is a constant B, while death has utility zero; second, he
assumed that the probability of successful transplantation π is a function of patient
health h and match quality q where πh(h,q) > 0, πq(h,q) > 0, as well as π(0,q) = 0
and π(h,0) = 0. In words, healthier patients have higher graft-success rates, while
better quality matches yield higher graft-success rates. Transplantations in patients
near death have very low chances of graft success, while low-quality matches have
very low chances of success. Third, Howard assumed that health evolves according
to a Markov process. Thus, the conditional probability density function of health in
the next period H′, only depends on health this period H: health today is a suﬃ-
cient statistic for a potential recipient’s entire health history. Notationally, we write
this conditional probability density function as fH′|H(h′|h). Fourth, he assumed a
per-period utility while alive of A and a constant discount factor ρ ∈ (0,1).
Under these assumptions, the expected value of the next-period pay-oﬀ to a patient




















where ΩW(h,q) is deﬁned by the ﬁxed point of the following Bellman equation of
optimality:
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Howard argued that the Accept and Reject regions of the state space (H,Q) should
look something like the regions depicted in ﬁgure 3. Speciﬁcally, in the early stages
of end-stage liver disease, when health h is relatively high, a potential recipient has
an high threshold match quality, but as the disease progresses and the potential
recipient’s health worsens, the threshold quality declines. The exact position of the
threshold line going from the southwest to the northeast will depend on a variety of
factors—the discount factor, per-period utility, the distribution of match qualities,
and the dynamics of the end-stage liver disease progression. In ﬁgure 3, we have
imposed the intuitively-reasonable condition that some one in near-perfect health (H
near one) would not decide to undergo liver transplantation, regardless of the quality
of the match.
Howard lacked the appropriate data to implement his model, so he relied on certain
comparative static properties of the conjectured solution to interpret aggregate data
concerning liver transplantation before the MELD scoring system was introduced.
Broadly speaking, he found that his model did reasonably well at explaining the
relevant and salient features of the aggregate data.









Figure 3: Accept and Reject Regions in Howard [2002] Model
of the problem in Howard [2002], demonstrating that, under plausible assumptions,
the optimal solution to the Markov decision problem has a control-limit optimal pol-
icy: for a patient of a given health status, accept any organ whose match quality is
above some threshold, which typically depends on the patient’s health status; other-
wise, wait for another organ to arrive. Using clinical data, Alagoz et al. also provided
numerical solutions to the Markov decision problem as well as examples where the op-
timal policy exhibited properties other than those depicted in ﬁgure 3. For example,
in ﬁgure 4, we depict an acceptance region in which the sickest potential recipients
require better matches than some of the healthier ones, hence the U-shaped thresh-
old locus in that ﬁgure. In fact, it is quite probable that for near-death patients
even a liver of the highest match-quality would be of no utility: death would occur
nonetheless. In any case, in their series of papers applied to organ transplantation,








Figure 4: Alternative Accept and Reject Regions
approach.
Howard implicitly assumed that all surgeons are equally informed about the match
quality of a donor organ and that each surgeon is only concerned about match quality
for her/his patient. While Howard did not consider the eﬀects of local competition
in Howard [2002] or Howard [2001a,b], it is clear by statements in those papers that
he was aware of potential eﬀects. Alagoz et al. [2007a, page 25] explicitly ruled out
strategic behaviour, stating
we assume that the decisions made by the patient[/surgeon] do not aﬀect the
policies of the other patients.
3.1 Analysis of the Transplantation Behaviour
In this subsection, we deduce the implications of competition on behaviour. At the
heart of our analysis is the question of whether local competition aﬀects the decision
17of a patient/surgeon to accept a donor liver for transplantation. Consider ﬁrst a single
transplant center having a waiting list having D potential recipients: in a particular
period, if a donor liver arrives, then the potential recipient with the highest MELD
score at the transplant center has the right of ﬁrst refusal. When the donor liver
is inspected, a match quality q is determined. At this point, the trade-oﬀ involves
deciding whether a future draw from the urn of donors will produce a better expected
match than the one currently in hand.
Now introduce a second transplant center in the Donation Service Area, and give
this transplant center every second potential recipients from the ﬁrst transplant cen-
ter’s ordered list. Under these conditions, the Donation Service Area has the same
expected aggregate supply of donor organs as in the single transplant center case, so
issues involving the relative supply of donor organs are unimportant. Note, too, that
the demographics in both the single transplant center and the two transplant center
cases are identical. Under UNOS, the allocation of livers between the two transplant
centers is again done according to MELD score: the potential recipient in the Dona-
tion Service Area with the highest MELD score has the right of ﬁrst refusal. When a
patient/surgeon with the highest MELD score is making an acceptance decision, the
trade-oﬀ involves not just deciding whether a future draw from the urn of donors can
be expected to be a better match than the one currently in hand, but also whether
the current highest MELD-score patient will have the right of ﬁrst refusal in a future
draw from the urn. End-stage liver disease is a progressive disease, but the progres-
sion is stochastic rather than deterministic: the potential recipient who currently
has the highest MELD score could be easily eclipsed by another patient at the other
transplant center in the Donation Service Area, or a new Status 1 patient in either
the Donation Service Area or the Region. In short, holding the expected supply of
18donor livers constant, waiting for another liver is more risky when competitors exist
than when no competitors exist. Consequently, all things being equal, the minimum
threshold quality for transplantation, at any health status, weakly decreases. In terms
of ﬁgure 3, under the assumptions made, the curve rotates to the southeast about the
point R. (It seems unlikely that those who did not wish to undergo transplantation
would want to do so under competition, but it cannot be ruled out: there may be
option value to having transplantation early rather than waiting.)
Competitors are like having an higher discount rate ρ in the problems investigated
by Howard [2002] as well as Alagoz et al. [2004, 2007a,b], so we refer to this willingness
to accept donor organs more readily under competition than when no competitors
exist as competitive impatience. We depict the policy functions in ﬁgure 5: for points
below a reservation quality, which has superscript ∗, the value of the policy is zero
(do not accept the organ), while for points above a reservation quality, the value of
the policy function is one (accept the organ). In that ﬁgure, the point S denotes the





B,NC denote the reservation qualities in the single transplant
center case.
Of course, it is quite possible that competitors in a Donation Service Area are
diﬀerent in terms of market presence or market power. That is, some transplant
centers will do more transplantations than others; some transplant centers have longer
waiting lists than others. What does this mean? Well, obviously, this introduces an
asymmetry into the transplantation game, which has interesting eﬀects. Consider a
Donation Service Area with a “large” transplant center (one which performs relatively
many transplantations because it has a large number of its waiting list, in the extreme,
































Figure 5: Reservation Quality under Diﬀerent Amounts of Competition
performs relatively few transplantations because it has a fewer patients on its waiting
list, in the extreme, say, one) which we shall refer to as B. All other things being
equal, under the MELD scoring system, donor livers are allocated to patients at the
top of the waiting list. Because transplant center A’s list is larger in absolute size,
a representative MELD ranking is more likely to have a sequence of patients from
transplant center A at the top of the list than a sequence of patients from transplant
center B; i.e.,
A1 ≥ A2 ≥ B1 ≥ A3 ≥ B2 ≥ ···
is a more likely sequence than
B1 ≥ B2 ≥ A1 ≥ A2 ≥ A3 ···
20Consequently, the reservation minimum threshold quality at transplant center A will
be weakly higher than at transplant center B: all other things being equal, competitive
impatience will be higher at smaller transplant centers than at larger ones. We depict
this in ﬁgure 5 where point A denotes the asymmetric equilibrium. In this example,
q∗
A,AC is above q∗
A,SC, but below q∗
A,NC, while q∗
B,AC is above both q∗
B,SC and q∗
B,NC.
3.2 Empirical Implications of Theoretical Predictions
The existence of competing transplant centers in a Donation Service Area aﬀects the
patient/surgeon decision through the mechanism we have referred to above as com-
petitive impatience: when competing transplant centers exist in a Donation Service
Area, this competition makes patient/surgeon decision-makers more likely to accept
a donor organ than when no competition exists. Thus, all other things being equal,
the matches made under competition are of weakly lower quality than when no com-
petitors exist. Assuming match quality aﬀects graft success in a weakly-positive way
and holding all other factors constant, one empirical implication of this is that the
survival function of the waiting time to graft failure after transplantation is weakly
greater when no competitors exist than that under competition, which means that
the average waiting time to graft failure after transplantation is weakly greater when
no competitors exist than that under competition.3 Another empirical implication
3For a non-negative random variable T, the integral of its survival function ST(t), which equals
[1−FT(t)], where FT(t) is the cumulative distribution function, is the expected value of the random
variable in question, provided the integral exists. Consider S1(t) and S2(t), the survival functions
of two non-negative random variables T1 and T2. If








S2(t) dt = E(T2).
21is this that, holding all other factors constant, the survival function of the waiting
time to graft failure after transplantation is weakly less for small competitors than
for large competitors, which means that the average waiting time to graft failure after
transplantation is weakly shorter for small competitors than for large competitors. In
section 5, we shall put speciﬁc structure on how we shall confront these predictions
with data.
4 Center-Speciﬁc Graft and Patient Survival-Rate
as well as Market-Speciﬁc Data
We obtained the publicly-available data used in this research from the Arbor Research
Collaborative for Health.4 Speciﬁcally, we used information from the SAS datasets
that were used to produce the Program Speciﬁc Reports; these were provided to us
by Andrew Barnes and Craig Lake of the Arbor Research Collaborative for Health.
The construction of the data is described in detail in the “Guide to the Program-
Speciﬁc Reports v 12.0, December 2009,” which is published by the Arbor Research
Collaborative for Health.
In any period, the four variables of interest to us are the actual, center-speciﬁc graft
and patient survival-rates (Actual GSR and Actual PSR) and the center-speciﬁc, risk-
adjusted average graft and patient survival-rates (Predicted GSR and Predicted PSR)
which were constructed by the staﬀ at Arbor at one month, one year, and three years
after transplantation using the methods described in the “Guide to the Program-
Speciﬁc Reports v 12.0, December 2009,” pages 20–36. To provide some idea concern-
ing how Actual GSR and Actual PSR as well as Predicted GSR and Predicted PSR
4Address: 315 West Huron Street, Suite 360, Ann Arbor, MI 48103.
22were constructed, we begin by describing how the data are collected by UNOS.
Prior to the creation of each report, data are collected over the previous thirty-
month observation period. For example, if the begin date of an observation period
were 1 July 2002, then the end date of that observation period would be 31 De-
cember 2004. We depict in ﬁgure 6 this initial observation period as the interval
between zero and thirty months. During this thirty-month period, data concerning
all transplantations are gathered from each center in all eleven UNOS regions of the
nation.
The most important data for our purposes are the graft and patient survival du-
rations. Representative survival durations are depicted in ﬁgure 6 by the horizontal
lines with “[” and “]” at the endpoints. These lines and endpoints represent com-
pleted spells—viz., grafts that have failed or patients who have died. Note that spells
often go beyond the observation periods; that is, some grafts have not failed or some
patients are still alive when data collection for that observation period ends, so these
spells are censored for this particular observation period. In ﬁgure 6, these are de-
picted by two of the spells in the top right of the ﬁgure—those which began before
month thirty, but ended after month thirty.
To describe the calculations that then take place, let us ﬁrst introduce some
additional notation. In any observation period indexed by ℓ = 1,2,...,L, we index
by i = 1,2,...Iℓ
j the patients who received transplantation at the centers indexed by
j = 1,2,...,Jℓ. We denote by tℓ
ij the survival duration of the graft (or the patient) for
patient i at center j in observation period ℓ. Some of the tℓ
ijs may be censored: to wit,
the graft has not yet failed or the patient has not yet died when observation period ℓ
ended, such as the two depicted in ﬁgure 6. We denote by zℓ
ij a p-vector of covariates
observed in period ℓ, concerning patient i at center j; these will be important when
23we describe how Predicted GSR and Predicted PSR are calculated.
Using the product-limit estimator of the survival function proposed by Edwin
L. Kaplan and Paul Meier [Kaplan and Meier, 1958], the Actual GSR and Actual PSR
data are calculated for each center at one month, one year, and three years. Note that
only center-speciﬁc data are used in each graft survival-rate and patient survival-rate
calculation.
In order to calculate the Predicted GSR and Predicted PSR data, all of the data
from all centers in the nation are used. Speciﬁcally, an empirical speciﬁcation pro-
posed by Sir David R. Cox [Cox, 1972], now commonly referred to as a Cox propor-
tional hazard rate model, is used to control for the patient-speciﬁc covariates z. In a
Cox proportional hazard rate model, the p-vector z inﬂuences λ(t|z), the conditional
post-transplantation hazard rate of the waiting time to graft failure (or patient death)
T, according to the following structure:
λ(t|z) = exp(zγ)λ0(t)
where γ is an unknown parameter vector conformable to z and λ0(t) is the baseline
hazard rate of a patient having z equal to a p-vector of zeros 0p. Both γ and λ0(t)










, data from all patients and all centers in
the nation during the the ℓth observation period.



























Having estimated γ and λ0(t), one can then estimate the conditional survival function

















Thus, for center j in observation period ℓ at any duration t, the average adjusted












ij) X = GSR, PSR.
The next report is created using information from an overlapping sample. Specif-
ically, data from the ﬁrst six months of the previous observation period are dropped,
and data from the next adjacent six-month period are added. In ﬁgure 6, the next
observation period would be between month six and month thirty-six, year three.
Continuing with our initial example, the begin date would then be 1 January 2003,
while the end date would be 30 June 2005.
As the MELD began on 1 February 2002, our ﬁrst begin date is 1 July 2002.
We depict this in ﬁgure 7. What to do about three-year survival rates? Well, these
must begin thirty months plus two years after the MELD began, so for reporting date
1 January 2007 onward. The last report date we have is 1 January 2010.
For each transplant center (center) in each Donation Service Area (dsa), we
250 6 months 1 year 18 months 2 years 30 months 3 years Time


























Figure 7: Post-MELD Data Gathering by UNOS
26constructed a unique center/dsa-speciﬁc identiﬁcation number (dcode), which was
then used to construct some of the covariates described below. Covariates of interest
to us are the number of transplantations performed at that transplant center during
the observation period (ntxs) as well as the number of transplant centers competing
in the Donation Service Area (ntxcs) and the total number of transplantations per-
formed in the Donation Service Area (tot txs) during the observation period. Using
the ntxcs in the Donation Service Area as well as the proportion of transplantations








which is a summary statistic for the dispersion in market share. When the proportion
of transplantations performed at a transplant center in a Donation Service Area is
the same as the inverse of ntxcs, the covariate share equals zero, so the covariate
has no eﬀect. (This would be what the covariate would be under equal market
shares for each transplant center in a Donation Service Area.) When the proportion
of transplantations performed at a transplant center in a Donation Service Area is
greater than the inverse of ntxcs, the covariate share is positive, while when the
proportion of transplantations performed at a transplant center in a Donation Service
Area is less than the inverse of ntxcs, the covariate share is negative.
With some entry and exit in this industry, constructing unequivocal measures of
competition in any Donation Service Area during an observation period is diﬃcult.
For example, suppose that in 1 July 2002 there were two centers in a Donation
Service Area, but on 30 November 2002 another entered, while on 14 November 2004
one of the ﬁrst two centers exited the market, and on 21 February 2005 a third
(fourth, depending on ones perspective) entered. What is the appropriate number of
27centers to use? Provided at least one transplant were reported at each center during
the observation period, we would report this as three for both observations because,
during each observation period, three centers would have been active in that Donation
Service Area.
In some states (for example, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee), sharing agreements
apply statewide, so Donation Service Area boundaries are irrelevant. In our ﬁnal
empirical speciﬁcation, we dealt with these by using the total number of centers in
the state as a measure of competition.
In table 1, we present descriptive statistics for our sample which contained 2,322
observations concerning 105 transplant centers in 53 Donation Service Areas in the
eleven UNOS regions—870 each concerning one-month and one-year durations and
582 concerning three-year durations.5 In the ﬁrst three rows, we present summary
statistics concerning the actual center-speciﬁc graft survival rates, while the next
three concern the center-speciﬁc, risk-adjusted average graft survival rates that were
constructed by the Arbor Research Collaborative for Health. In the next three rows,
we present summary statistics concerning the actual center-speciﬁc patient survival
rates, while the next three concern the center-speciﬁc, risk-adjusted average patient
survival rates, again constructed by the Arbor Research Collaborative for Health. The
next four rows concern the market-speciﬁc data—speciﬁcally, the number of trans-
plantations performed at a transplant center, the total number of transplantations
performed in a Donation Service Area, the number of transplant centers in a Donation
Service Area, and the share variable deﬁned above. In order to be ﬂexible concerning
the eﬀects of the covariate ntxcs, we also constructed indicator variables for Dona-
tion Service Areas having just one transplant center (one), two transplant centers
5Fewer observations concerning three-year durations exist because fewer observation periods in-
volving only post-MELD transplantations exist.
28(two), three transplant centers (three), four transplant centers (four), and ﬁve or
more transplant centers (five+). Thus, the ﬁnal ﬁve rows concern dummy variables
describing the number of competitors in the various Donation Service Areas.
Around one ﬁfth of all Donation Service Areas in the sample have just one trans-
plant center, while around another one quarter of the Donation Service Areas have
ﬁve or more transplant centers.6 About one third of the Donation Service Areas have
just two transplant centers, which is also the median for this sample, while around ten
percent have three or four Donation Service Areas each. In this sample, around 129
transplantations are performed at an average transplant center over the thirty month
recording period used to calculate the center-speciﬁc actual graft survival rates and
patient survival rates as well as risk-adjusted average graft survival rates and patient
survival rates (around one per week), but there is considerable dispersion. For exam-
ple, the sample minimum is one, while the sample maximum is 575, which translates
into around four transplantations per week. The median share variable in the sample
is zero, while the minimum is −4.1163 and the maximum is 1.3863.
5 Empirical Results
We investigated empirically the following question: does the presence of local com-
petition aﬀect the post-transplantation outcomes? The theoretical structure outlined
above suggests that the control-limit quality Q∗ will depend on patient-speciﬁc char-
acteristics, which we collect in the vector z, as well as center- and market-speciﬁc
characteristics, which we collect in the vector m. We hypothesize that the un-
6This does not mean that, at any point in time, one ﬁfth of all Donation Service Areas have
just one transplant center. Rather, that for one ﬁfth of our data the dummy variable one is one.
Note that our sample was gathered over a six-year period, during which some entry and exit have
occurred in these Donation Service Areas: evidence the exit of CASM-TX1 mentioned in section 2.
29Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Actual GSR, one-month 0.9325 0.0471 0.9410 0.6360 1
Actual GSR, one-year 0.8291 0.0685 0.8380 0.5000 1
Actual GSR, three-year 0.7301 0.0869 0.7335 0.2500 1
Predicted GSR, one-month 0.9370 0.0128 0.9380 0.8710 0.9670
Predicted GSR, one-year 0.8324 0.0287 0.8350 0.7030 0.9030
Predicted GSR, three-year 0.7319 0.0365 0.7340 0.6120 0.8640
Actual PSR, one-month 0.9489 0.0461 0.9590 0.5000 1
Actual PSR, one-year 0.8589 0.0657 0.8680 0.3330 1
Actual PSR, three-year 0.7729 0.0804 0.7790 0.2500 1
Predicted PSR, one-month 0.9573 0.0121 0.9590 0.8200 0.9810
Predicted PSR, one-year 0.8687 0.0259 0.8720 0.6580 0.9290
Predicted PSR, three-year 0.7809 0.0327 0.7850 0.4790 0.9160
ntxcs 2.9630 1.7143 2 1 6
ntxs 128.5310 98.6378 103 1 575
tot txs 327.7196 204.2987 279 1 861
share −0.1137 0.7149 0 −4.1163 1.3863
one 0.1960 0.3970 0 0 1
two 0.3695 0.4828 0 0 1
three 0.0930 0.2905 0 0 1
four 0.1064 0.3084 0 0 1
five+ 0.2351 0.4242 0 0 1
30observed control-limit Q∗ aﬀects post-transplantation graft survival duration in a
weakly-positive way according to the following function:
T = τ [Q
∗(z,m)] τ
′(q) ≥ 0.
Thus, the distribution of Q∗, conditional on z and m, induces a distribution of T,
conditional on z and m.
We have chosen to confront the predictions of our theoretical framework using the
data described in the previous section employing an empirical speciﬁcation inspired
by the research of Cox [1972] (which concerned hazard rates), but applied to survival
functions. We cannot, of course, implement Cox’s approach because we do not have
micro-level data, only center-speciﬁc averages. We should note, however, that the
center-speciﬁc, risk-adjusted average graft survival-rate and patient survival-rate data
are generated using results from a Cox proportional hazard-rate model.
Within our empirical framework, the observed covariates, which are collected in
the vectors z and m, as well as a single dimension of unobserved heterogeneity ˆ U (or
ˆ V ), are assumed to inﬂuence the Actual GSR (or Actual PSR) post-transplantation
graft (or patient) survival-rate according to the following equations:
Actual GSR(t) = Predicted GSR(t) × exp(mδG + ˆ U)
or
Actual PSR(t) = Predicted PSR(t) × exp(mδP + ˆ V )
where δG and δP are unknown parameter vectors conformable to m. Within this
framework, the patient-speciﬁc covariates z are embedded in Predicted GSR (and
31Predicted PSR) as a result of the conditioning performed using the Cox proportional
hazard-rate model.
Now,
log[Actual GSR(1)] − log[Predicted GSR(1)] = mδG + ˆ U1
log[Actual GSR(12)] − log[Predicted GSR(12)] = mδG + ˆ U12
log[Actual GSR(36)] − log[Predicted GSR(36)] = mδG + ˆ U36
which we write, for each transplant center indexed by j in each Donation Service
Area indexed by k, as
Yjk,1 = mjkδG + Ujk,1
Yjk,12 = mjkδG + Ujk,12
Yjk,36 = mjkδG + Ujk,36
where Yjk,t equals (log[Actual GSRjk(t)] − log[Predicted GSRjk(t)]) and where U dif-
fers from ˆ U by measurement or reporting errors, which are probably small.7 In-
troducing the index over all observations of duration t in all reporting periods n =
7To save space, we do not write-out the equations for Actual PSR and Predicted PSR as the
reasoning is straightforward.
321,2,...,Nt, we can write this in matrix notation as
Y =

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= XδG + U (1)
where the matrix MNt collects the vectors of center- and market-speciﬁc covariates.
The parameters of the measurement equation (1) can estimated a number of ways—
e.g., by the method of least squares (LS), or by the method of least absolute deviations
(LAD).
The overlapping nature of the samples introduces potential dependence among
some of the error terms in the empirical speciﬁcations. This dependence could aﬀect
the standard errors of the estimates and, hence, inﬂuence inference. Thus, we used
estimators of the least-squares standard errors that are robust to arbitrary forms
heteroskedasticity as well as some forms of autocorrelation. Such so-called “HAC
estimators” were ﬁrst proposed by Whitney K. Newey and Kenneth D. West [Newey
and West, 1987] and then developed further by Donald K. Andrews [Andrews, 1991]
as well as Andrews and J. Christoper Monahan [Andrews and Monahan, 1992]; this
work built on the research of Friedhelm Eicker [Eicker, 1963] and Halbert L. White
[White, 1980]. The computation of these standard errors is discussed in detail by
Achim Zeileis [Zeileis, 2004].
In table 2, we present the LS and LAD estimates of the parameters of interest.8
Beneath each estimate, in parentheses, is reported the robust standard error. In the
row denoted “SSR,” is reported the sum of squared residuals. The LAD estimates,
8Here, we have also included as covariates one-month, one-year, and three-year dummy variables
(which are denoted d01, d12, and d36) to ensure that no residual duration dependence exists in the
data; the results are qualitatively similar when these covariates are excluded.















which correspond to the regression equivalent of the median, are robust to contami-
nation.
In general, what can one conclude from the inclusion of the market covariates
into equation (1)? First, contrary to what has been reported previously in the litera-
ture (see, for example, the research by Erick B. Edwards, John P. Roberts, Maureen
A. McBride, James A. Schulak, and Lawrence G. Hunsicker [Edwards et al., 1999]),
we have found that the number of transplantations performed at a transplant center
has no important eﬀect on average graft survival rates; the estimated coeﬃcient on
ntxs, while negative, is statistically insigniﬁcant—a p-value of 0.38. Second, when
estimated by the method of LS, the number of transplant centers in the Donation Ser-
vice Area, ntxcs, is calculated to have a negative eﬀect on the post-transplantation
graft survival rate, as the theory above predicted: each additional transplant cen-
ter in a Donation Service Area is predicted to reduce the average survival-rate by
about one-quarter of one percent, but the p-value is only 0.102. On the other hand,
when estimated by the method of LAD, the number of transplant centers in the
34Donation Service Area, ntxcs, is predicted to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the post-
transplantation graft survival rates; its p-value is 0.74. Third, as predicted above, an
above “average” market share translates into an increase in the post-transplantation
graft survival rate. For example, consider a Donation Service Area in which two
transplant centers compete, where one transplant center performs two-thirds of the
transplantations, while the other performs one third: the “larger” transplant cen-
ter has an average graft survival rate that is around 2.85 percent greater than the
“smaller” one; the LAD estimate is about half that, but both have p-values less than
0.04. That Edwards et al. [1999] did not include measures of competition may ex-
plain why they found a positive relationship between post-transplant outcomes and
the number of transplants performed: the distribution of transplantations among
transplant centers was ignored.
In table 3, we report next the LS and LAD estimates for the dependent variable Y
where we have also included center-speciﬁc dummy variables. In order to implement
the empirical speciﬁcation, we have had to alter it slightly, without aﬀecting its
empirical content. Speciﬁcally, we substituted a constant for the d01 dummy variable.
Also, in order to relax the linearity constraint concerning the eﬀect of the number of
competing transplant centers in a Donation Service Area, as noted in section 3, we
introduced dummy variables to represent varying levels of competition; the omitted
dummy variable is the one-transplant center category, one. While there are 105
transplant centers in our sample, only 104 dummy variables were included in the
empirical speciﬁcations; the omitted center was WAUW-TX1, a transplant center
with no other competitors in its Donation Service Area.
What do the estimates in table 3 tell us? In short, the number of transplantations
performed at a transplant center is predicted to decrease the average graft survival
35Table 3: LS and LAD Estimates of Equation (1) Including Center-Speciﬁc Dummy





















rate for each additional transplant; its p-value is 0.002. Additional competition is
predicted to decrease the average graft survival rate by between 2.3 and 9.3 percent,
depending on the number of transplant centers in the Donation Service Area and the
estimation method. The share of transplantations performed by a transplant center
in a Donation Service Area is predicted to increase the average graft survival rate; its
p-value is 0.001 under least squares. For example, again consider a Donation Service
Area in which two transplant centers compete, where one transplant center performs
two-thirds of the transplants, while the other performs one third: the “larger” trans-
plant center has an average graft survival rate that is around 6.6 percent greater than
the “smaller” one: bigger is better in this empirical speciﬁcation.















Figure 8: Histogram of LS Center-Speciﬁc Estimated Eﬀects
We do not think it either fruitful or illuminating to report all 104 estimated co-
eﬃcients on the dummy variables. However, in ﬁgure 8, we depict the histogram
of estimated coeﬃcients, while in ﬁgure 9, we depict the kernel-smoothed estimated
density of the percentage diﬀerences across transplant centers in our sample. The
striking feature of this latter ﬁgure is the extreme variability in center-speciﬁc pre-
dicted outcomes. The range is between −20 percent and +20 percent. That is, having
controlled for patient-speciﬁc characteristics, diﬀerent transplant centers can diﬀer by
forty percent in the post-transplantation outcomes as measured by the average graft
survival rate. (To make sure that this extreme range is not an artifact of the method
of estimation, we also investigated the center-speciﬁc estimates generated by LAD;
they were qualitatively the similar, but the range is slight smaller, only thirty percent,
and are depicted in ﬁgures 10 and 11.)
What is causing this extreme variability? Because patient-speciﬁc characteris-
tics have been used to construct the risk-adjusted average graft survival rates, the
estimates of coeﬃcients corresponding to the center-speciﬁc dummy variables would













































Figure 9: Kernel-Smoothed, LS Center-Speciﬁc Estimated Eﬀects















Figure 10: Histogram of LAD Center-Speciﬁc Estimated Eﬀects













































Figure 11: Kernel-Smoothed, LAD Center-Speciﬁc Estimated Eﬀects
appear to be capturing center-speciﬁc diﬀerences in graft success outcomes. Why are
these diﬀerences obtaining? Is it because of diﬀerences in the culture of surgery at
diﬀerent transplant centers (viz., increased risks are taken at some transplant cen-
ters, and not at others) or because the quality of surgeons diﬀers across transplant
centers (viz., some transplant centers attract the very best, while others can only
attract those who just barely passed the Board examinations)? Unfortunately, the
average data to which we have had access do not permit us to address such important
questions.
We next proceeded to analyse the eﬀects of competition on patient survival rates,
the Actual PSR and Predicted PSR data. In table 4, we present the LS and LAD
estimates of the parameters of interest.
In general, what can one conclude from the inclusion of the market covariates?
First, again, contrary to what has been reported previously in the literature, we have
found that the number of transplantations performed at a transplant center has no
important eﬀect on average patient survival rates; the LS estimated coeﬃcient on















ntxs, while positive, is small 0.00003, one-third of one basis point, and statistically
insigniﬁcant. Second, the number of transplant centers in the Donation Service Area,
ntxcs, is estimated to have a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the post-transplantation
patient survival rate, as the theory above predicted: each additional transplant center
in a Donation Service Area is predicted to reduce the average patient survival rate
by between one-tenth and three-tenths of one percent, with a p-value of less than
0.009. Third, as predicted above, an above “average” market share translates into
an increase in the post-transplantation patient survival rate.
In table 5, we report next the LS and LAD estimates when we also included center-
speciﬁc dummy variables. Again, in order to implement the empirical speciﬁcation,
we have had to alter it slightly, without aﬀecting its empirical content. Speciﬁcally, we
substituted a constant for the d01 dummy variable. Also, in order to relax the linearity
constraint concerning the eﬀect of the number of competing transplant centers in a
Donation Service Area, we introduced dummy variables to represent varying levels of
competition; the omitted dummy variable is the one-transplant center category, one.
40Only 104 dummy variables were included in the empirical speciﬁcations; the omitted
center was again WAUW-TX1, a TXC with no other competitors in its Donation
Service Area.
What do the LS estimates in table 5 tell us? In short, the number of transplan-
tations performed at a transplant center is predicted to decrease the average patient
survival rate for each additional transplant; its p-value is 0.081. Additional compe-
tition is predicted to decrease the average patient survival rate by between 3.4 and
10.5 percent, depending on the number of transplant centers in the Donation Service
Area. The share of transplantations performed by a transplant center in a Donation
Service Area is predicted to increase the average patient survival rate; its p-value is
0.002. In the example in which two transplant centers compete, where one transplant
center performs two-thirds of the transplants, while the other performs one third,
the “larger” transplant center has an average patient survival rate that is around 5.0
percent greater than the “smaller” one: bigger is better in this empirical speciﬁca-
tion, too. The LAD estimates are qualitatively similar, but quantitatively smaller in
magnitude.
We do not report all 104 estimated coeﬃcients on the dummy variables, nor do we
present graphs as we did for the graft survival-rate data, but the results are similar
to the graft survival-rate ones.
Of course, the reader may rightly be concerned that using of the observations
across diﬀerent durations could be inducing the empirical results we observe. Thus,
we estimated the graft survival rate and patient survival rate equations across separate
durations, including as covariates the competition dummy and center-speciﬁc dummy
variables as well as the share variable, thus performing the estimation on the same
durations—one month, one year, and three years. We report in tables 6 and 7 the LS
41Table 5: LS and LAD Estimates of Equation (1) Including Center-Speciﬁc Dummy





















42Table 6: LS Estimates of Competition and Share Eﬀects: Graft Survival-Rate and
Patient Survival-Rate Equations, Including Center-Speciﬁc Dummy Variables, By
Duration
Variable GSR(1) PSR(1) GSR(12) PSR(12) GSR(36) PSR(36)
ntxs −0.00018 −0.00009 −0.00032 −0.00010 −0.00027 −0.00015
(0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00013) (0.00018) (0.00020)
two −0.01864 −0.01752 −0.05684 −0.05003 −0.09653 −0.05653
(0.01219) (0.01211) (0.01799) (0.02323) (0.04687) (0.02920)
three −0.05526 −0.05128 −0.11293 −0.10745 −0.16393 −0.12885
(0.01955) (0.02180) (0.03168) (0.04147) (0.05351) (0.05615)
four −0.07220 −0.06385 −0.13198 −0.11991 −0.18075 −0.15210
(0.02542) (0.02886) (0.03969) (0.05517) (0.08134) (0.07835)
five+ −0.09278 −0.08834 −0.13945 −0.12436 −0.18682 −0.17375
(0.02942) (0.03368) (0.04708) (0.06495) (0.09000) (0.08745)
share 0.04931 0.03644 0.08560 0.05673 0.04998 0.05665
(0.01713) (0.02093) (0.02633) (0.03983) (0.05319) (0.05219)
and LAD estimates of the coeﬃcients concerning the competion dummy variables as
well as the share variable.
Consider the results in table 6. The general pattern is that the eﬀects of compe-
tition on graft survival rates across durations are stronger than for patient survival
rates, but these eﬀects increase as the duration increase. For example, consider the
columns GSR(1) and PSR(1): each of the estimates in the GSR(1) column is smaller
(more negative) than those in the PSR(1) column. Across the GSR columns, how-
ever, the eﬀect becomes more pronounced at longer durations: the estimates in the
GSR(36) column for competition are all much smaller (more negative) than those for
the GSR(1) column. The share variable ﬂuctuates across the columns, but never
changes sign. However, it is imprecisely estimated (has large standard errors) for the
longest duration, three years. In ﬁgures 12 and 13, we present the LS percentage
reductions in the graft survival rates and patient survival rates, by duration, for dif-
ferent numbers of transplant centers in the Donation Service Area. This pattern is
43Table 7: LAD Estimates of Competition and Share Eﬀects: Graft Survival-Rate and
Patient Survival-Rate Equations, Including Center-Speciﬁc Dummy Variables, By
Duration
Variable GSR(1) PSR(1) GSR(12) PSR(12) GSR(36) PSR(36)
ntxs −0.00010 −0.00006 −0.00026 −0.00018 −0.00014 −0.00000
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00009) (0.00009)
two −0.00204 −0.00490 −0.06570 −0.03967 −0.04027 −0.03726
(0.01142) (0.00970) (0.01979) (0.01795) (0.02933) (0.02810)
three −0.02891 −0.02582 −0.11639 −0.11305 −0.07396 −0.08174
(0.01576) (0.01333) (0.02731) (0.02466) (0.03692) (0.03541)
four −0.03295 −0.03200 −0.12854 −0.12129 −0.07129 −0.09477
(0.01715) (0.01442) (0.02973) (0.02667) (0.03901) (0.03779)
five+ −0.04504 −0.04027 −0.11989 −0.10983 −0.10438 −0.13255
(0.01828) (0.01533) (0.03169) (0.02835) (0.04000) (0.03867)
share 0.01850 0.01277 0.06034 0.05746 0.00286 0.02418
(0.00360) (0.00259) (0.00624) (0.00479) (0.00914) (0.00869)
qualitatively similar for the LAD estimates presented in table 7.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Previous researchers have modelled the patient/surgeon decision of whether to ac-
cept a donor organ for transplantation as a Markov decision problem, the solution to
which (under plausible assumptions) is a control-limit optimal policy: for a patient of
a given health status, accept any organ whose quality is above some threshold, which
typically depends on the patient’s health status; otherwise, wait for another organ
to arrive. The presence of competing transplant centers in a Donation Service Area
is predicted to aﬀect the patient/surgeon acceptance decision through a mechanism
we have referred to as competitive impatience: competition makes patient/surgeon
decision-makers more likely to accept a donor organ than when no competition ex-
ists, which means (all other things being equal) the matches made under competition











































































Figure 12: LS Percentage Change in Graft Survival Rates, by Duration and Number
of transplant centers in Donation Service Area













































































Figure 13: LS Percentage Change in Patient Survival Rates, by Duration and Number
of transplant centers in Donation Service Area
45are predicted to be of weakly lower quality. Assuming match quality aﬀects graft
success in a weakly-positive way and holding all other factors constant, the survival
function of the waiting time to graft failure after transplantation is then predicted to
be weakly greater when no competitors exist than that under competition. When the
competing transplant centers in a Donation Service Area perform diﬀerent numbers of
transplantations and have waiting lists of diﬀerent lengths, such asymmetries are also
predicted to aﬀect post-transplantation outcomes. Using center-speciﬁc actual as well
as risk-adjusted average graft survival-rate and patient survival-rate data concerning
cadaveric-liver transplantations in adults in the United States, we have found that the
predictions of the theory are borne out by the data. We have also found evidence that
center-speciﬁc heterogeneity is very important in aﬀecting post-transplantation out-
comes. Our research also suggests that, in order to test the hypothesis of competitive
impatience, disaggregated, center-speciﬁc, match-list data are required.
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